

U.S. Export Controls on Internet Software Transactions

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Abstract

This article examines the legal responsibilities under the U.S. export control program for software vendors that provide software products over the Internet and other companies offering computing and data processing services under “software as a service” or “cloud computing” business models. The regulations implementing this export control program restrict the “export” of certain categories of commercial software products, especially products with data encryption functions and features, and define the concept of “export” extremely broadly to include a wide range of intangible transactions. Similarly, the regulations impose legal duties on software vendors and service providers to prevent their products and services from falling into the hands of persons and entities located in countries subject to U.S. trade embargoes, proscribed parties (such as international terrorists), and entities engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This article suggests steps that software vendors and service providers may (and must) take in order to resolve or mitigate the tensions and to address the unique compliance challenges presented by the intersection of strict regulatory duties and the global and semi-anonymous nature of Internet software transactions and cloud computing.

I. Introduction

The United States maintains a comprehensive program of controls over the export and reexport of commodities, software, and technology through a series of regulatory programs. Defense items, specified on the U.S. Munitions List or as otherwise specially designed, modified, customized, or adapted for military use, are subject to the munitions export control program set forth in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations¹ (ITAR), which are issued under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act² and are administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

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1. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2010).

2. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2010).

Commercial (or dual use) commodities, software, and technology are subject to export controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).³ These commercial export controls, which are administered by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, are directly applicable to most software export transactions and are, therefore, the focus of this paper.

The export controls embodied in the EAR are implemented by a licensing procedure. Prior authorization from the Bureau of Industry and Security, in the form of an export license, may be required for certain export or reexport transactions, depending on:

- (i) the export classification and export control status of the commodities, software, or technology involved in the transaction;⁴
- (ii) the destination or destinations to which those commodities, software, or technology will be exported or reexported;⁵
- (iii) the identity of the end-user to which the commodities, software, or technology will be supplied;⁶ and
- (iv) the intended end-use of the commodities, software, or technology.⁷

In any transaction involving the export or reexport of items subject to the EAR, it is the exporter that is legally responsible for determining, based on the foregoing factors, whether the transaction: (i) is authorized without an export license (*i.e.*, the items are

3. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2010). The EAR were originally issued under authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended. 50 App. U.S.C.A. App. § 2401-20. That statute expired on August 20, 2001, but the EAR have been continued in force by Exec. Order No. 13222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44024 (2001), under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2008).

4. Commodities, software, and technology that are subject to export controls under the EAR are listed on the Commerce Control List, which is published as Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the EAR. 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. 3 (2008). Those controlled items are organized by export classification control number (ECCN). Each ECCN entry on the Commerce Control List provides a detailed description by technical specifications or performance parameters of the items subject to control, the reasons why that item is controlled (*e.g.*, national security, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, anti-terrorism, etc.), and the "export license exceptions" that may be available for the export or reexport of the items to some foreign countries.

5. Controlled countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, Cuba, China, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macau, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1. Many items that may be exported without restriction or under an export license exception to other countries require a specific export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security for export to any of those controlled countries. *Id.* Moreover, there are comprehensive embargoes on exports or reexports of all or substantially all items subject to the EAR to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

6. The U.S. government maintains a series of lists of prohibited and restricted persons and firms (*e.g.*, the Commerce Department's Denied Parties List; the Commerce Department's Entity List; the Treasury Department's OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons). Those lists of prohibited and restricted parties may be found on the Bureau of Industry and Security's website. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Lists to Check, <http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/liststocheck.htm> (last visited Apr. 30, 2010). The export or reexport of any item subject to the EAR, to any such prohibited or restricted party, may be prohibited or may require an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security or from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

7. Items that may otherwise be freely exported to almost any foreign country, without restriction or prior authorization, require export licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security for export to certain countries if, at the time of export, the exporter knows (or should know) that the items may be used in activities directly or indirectly related to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(5) (General Prohibition No. 5).

eligible for export under NLR or no license required); (ii) meets the conditions, requirements, and restrictions of an "export license exception" as specified in part 740 of the EAR; or (iii) requires an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security.⁸ For this purpose, the term "exporter" is defined in section 772.1 of the EAR as: "The person in the United States who has the authority of a principal party in interest to determine and control the sending of items out of the United States."⁹

As discussed in this paper, transactions that involve the export of software by means of electronic transmission or download over the Internet present significant export compliance challenges, especially where the exporter: (i) is not the developer of the software; and (ii) has little or no information about the customer. Under such circumstances, the exporter may be unable to make an independent determination as to the ECCN export classification of the software product in question and may have no information as to the identity or location of the customer or intended end-user of the software.

There is a third regulatory program that may also restrict Internet transactions involving U.S. origin software. Specifically, the various Economic Sanctions Regulations,¹⁰ issued and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,¹¹ generally prohibit the export or reexport of U.S. origin goods, technology (including software) and *services* to: (i) countries that are subject to comprehensive U.S. embargoes (*i.e.*, Cuba, Iran, and Sudan); (ii) entities, wherever located, that are owned or controlled by or affiliated with the governments of those embargoed countries; (iii) the governments of certain terrorist supporting countries (*e.g.*, Syria); (iv) international terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations; and (v) persons and firms listed on the OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons.¹² As discussed in this paper, the potential application of those OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations implies that entities making software or services available over the Internet must screen the parties to proposed transactions in order to assure that the software or services will not be received in an embargoed country or by a person or entity on the OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked parties.

II. The Concept of an "Export" for Export Control Purposes

In the early days of the software industry, substantially all software transactions involved the physical shipment and delivery of a tangible embodiment of the software product (*i.e.*, software encoded on some form of carrier media, such as a magnetic tape, disk, CD-ROM, or DVD). With the advent of the Internet, and the tremendous growth in e-Commerce transactions involving software products, however, a very significant and growing percentage of all commercial software "fulfillments" or deliveries involve electronic transmissions or downloads of software code, where there is no shipment of any tangible item from the supplier to the customer. In many such electronic software trans-

8. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.

9. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1.

10. 31 C.F.R. pts. 500-98 (2010).

11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2010).

12. See Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC Sanctions Programs, <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/index.shtml>.

actions, especially those involving consumer or mass-market software products, the software supplier is likely to have little or no direct interaction or knowledge of its customer, other than a credit card number and an e-mail address.

Unlike export control regimes in a number of other countries, the EAR makes no distinction, for U.S. export control purposes, between the physical shipment of tangible items from the United States to a foreign country, and the electronic transmission of software or technology from the United States to a person or entity located abroad. For export control purposes, any such physical shipment or electronic transmission is an "export," which must be effected in conformance with the requirements and restrictions embodied in the EAR. Thus, EAR defines the term "export" to include any "actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United States."¹³

As discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this paper, *infra*, a key factor in determining whether a particular software product is a controlled item under the EAR is the presence of any data encryption function or features in that software product. Section 734.2(b)(9) of the EAR sets forth a special, and expansive, definition of the concept of an "export" with respect to such encryption software, in source code or object code form. An "export" of encryption source code and object code software occurs when:

- (i) there is an actual shipment, transfer, or transmission of that encryption software out of the United States;
- (ii) the software is downloaded to locations outside of the United States (including electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol (FTP) sites, and World Wide Web sites); and
- (iii) the software is "made available" for transfer outside of the United States by means of posting to communications facilities that are accessible to persons outside of the United States (including electronic bulletin boards, FTP sites, and World Wide Web sites), unless steps are taken to prevent unauthorized transfer of that encryption software.¹⁴

These provisions of the EAR define the concept of an "export" to include the electronic transmission of software to locations outside of the United States and the making of software (at least encryption software) available for download by persons located outside of the United States. Using this definition, these provisions of the EAR imply that a software supplier that proposes to fulfill orders for its products electronically or to make software products available for download by its customers from the supplier's website or online store, has the same export compliance responsibilities under the EAR as does any entity that makes physical export shipments of tangible items (commodities, software, or technology) to customers located outside of the United States.

III. Export Control Status of Application Software Products

As noted in Section 1 of this paper, *supra*, one of the fundamental elements in assuring that software export transactions, including Internet transactions, are handled in compliance with the export control requirements of the EAR is the determination of the correct export classification (ECCN) and control status of the software product to be exported.

13. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b).

14. § 734.2(b)(9).

There are essentially two rubrics under which a particular application software product may be classified as a controlled item for export control purposes under the EAR:

- a. A number of controlled ECCN categories on the Commerce Control List cover software that is specially designed for the development, production, or use of controlled commodities.¹⁵ Thus, for example, ECCN 3D003 imposes export controls on certain CAD software for the design of semiconductor circuits.¹⁶ Correspondingly, ECCN 5D001 imposes export controls on software that is required for the use of controlled telecommunications equipment.¹⁷
- b. Subject to certain limited exceptions, application software products are classified under ECCN 5D002 and are subject to strict export controls if those products contain or support data encryption functionality or features. Exceptions exist for software products that: (i) use encryption technology solely for user authentication, password protection, or other forms of access control; or (ii) utilize or support only very weak encryption functionality (*i.e.*, a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key length not exceeding 56 bits or an asymmetric encryption algorithm with a key length not exceeding 512 bits). If a software application with encryption functionality does not, however, fall within the scope of one of those exceptions, it will be subject to the encryption (EI) export controls, and prior authorization from the Bureau of Industry and Security will be required in order to export or reexport that software application.¹⁸

The Cryptography Note to the Commerce Control List indicates that certain “mass market” encryption software products are not subject to the strict encryption export control regime. Such “mass market” software products are those which: (i) are distributed through retail distribution channels (including electronic transactions over the Internet); (ii) include a cryptographic functionality that is not user-accessible and cannot be easily changed by the user; and (iii) are designed for installation and use by the user without substantial support from the supplier (*i.e.*, “plug and play”).¹⁹ An exporter may treat a particular encryption software product as a “mass market” product *only if* that exporter has obtained an export classification ruling from the Bureau of Industry and Security confirming that the product meets the “mass market” criteria, and is properly classified for export control purposes under ECCN 5D992, in accordance with section 742.15(b)(1) of the EAR.²⁰

There is a great deal of software, including open source software, that is freely available for download without restriction from the Internet. Such freely available software *may* be excluded from the export controls described in this paper. Thus, “publicly available” technology and software are not subject to the EAR.²¹ Items and activities that are *not* subject

15. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. 1 (2010).

16. *Id.* (Category 3).

17. *Id.* (Category 5, Part 1).

18. Section 740.17 of the EAR establishes license exception ENC, which authorizes the export and re-export, without export licenses, of software products with encryption functions or features classified under ECCN 5D002. In order to utilize that license exception ENC as authority for the export or reexport of a particular encryption software product, however, the product must undergo “one time technical review” by the Bureau of Industry and Security. 15 C.F.R. § 740.17(d); Part 774 supp. 1 (Category 5, Part 2).

19. 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. 1 (Category 5, Part 2).

20. *Id.*

21. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3).

to the EAR are outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the EAR and are not affected by these regulations.²²

It should be emphasized, however, that the exclusion for “publicly available technology and software” does *not* apply to (i) encryption software classified under ECCN 5D002 or (ii) mass market encryption software classified under ECCN 5D992.²³ Accordingly, the software supplier that proposes to make software products with encryption functions or features available for download from an Internet site without restriction, even at no charge to the end-user, will be required to satisfy the following export compliance steps with respect to that encryption software:

- a. Assuring that the software products are authorized for export. Generally, encryption software that is available for download from an Internet site will meet the “mass market” criteria of the Cryptography Note in the Commerce Control List, *supra*. As explained above, however, under section 742.15(b)(1) of the EAR before that “mass market” encryption software product may be made available for download by persons located outside of the United States or Canada, a CCATS export classification ruling for the software product must be obtained from the Bureau of Industry and Security, confirming that the product does, in fact, meet the “mass market” criteria.²⁴
- b. Unless the software products are made available for download on an anonymous basis,²⁵ taking steps to assure that the products will not be: (i) downloaded to a location in an embargoed country; (ii) downloaded by, or made available to, a person or entity listed on one of the U.S. government’s lists of prohibited and restricted parties; or (iii) used in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

IV. Specific Internet Software Export Transactions: Export Compliance Obligations

Based on the provisions of the EAR outlined in the preceding Sections of this paper, each of the following categories of Internet software export transactions carries with it important export compliance responsibilities for the software supplier. Also, given the nature of the Internet, these export transactions carry export compliance challenges for the supplier that may not arise in transactions in which tangible items (*i.e.*, carrier media) embodying the software are physically shipped by the supplier to the foreign customer.

a. *Electronic Fulfillment of Software Licensing Transaction:* In this category of software transaction, the software supplier negotiates a software license agreement directly with

22. § 734.2(a)(1).

23. § 734.3(b)(3).

24. § 742.15.

25. On September 11, 2009, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued an advisory opinion that provides that a software supplier that makes mass market encryption software available for download from an internet site on a free and anonymous basis would not be subject to these end-user and end-use compliance requirements. If, however, the software supplier collects information about the end-user, such as user name and e-mail address, then the download transaction would not be considered anonymous, and the software supplier would be deemed to be in violation of the EAR if the software was downloaded to an embargoed country or by a prohibited or restricted person or entity. See Advisory Opinion, Bureau of Industry & Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Downloads of encrypted software reviewed and classified as ‘mass market’” (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/advisoryopinions/encryption_internet_ao.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].

each of its customers. For the convenience of the parties and to minimize costs, (e.g., shipping costs, customs duties, if applicable, etc.) the software supplier transmits the software over the Internet from the supplier's server to the customer's computer once the software license agreement has been concluded. If the customer is located outside of the United States, the transmission of that software from the supplier's server (located in the United States) constitutes an export of that software under section 734.2(b)(1) of the EAR, *supra* ("export" includes transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United States). Therefore, for such an electronic software transmission, the software supplier must fulfill the following export compliance responsibilities:

- As the "exporter," the supplier must assure that the software is authorized for export to the destination in question under authority of NLR, an export license exception, or an export license issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security. As the software in this type of commercial transaction is typically not publicly available without restriction and is not furnished on a no charge basis to the customer, the software will not meet the requirements of section 734.3(b)(3) of the EAR.²⁶ To the contrary, the software product will be "subject to the EAR" within the meaning of section 734.3(a) of the EAR.²⁷ Moreover, if the software product in question includes data encryption functionality, and if the software is supplied to customers on the basis of individual license agreements, the product will most likely *not* qualify as a "mass market" encryption item. As such, it will be necessary to qualify that encryption software product for eligibility for export under an authority of license exception ENC through a "one time technical review" by the Bureau of Industry and Security in accordance with section 740.17(d) of the EAR.²⁸
- Section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR identifies certain categories of encryption products (e.g., network infrastructure commodities and software; encryption software in source code form, other than open source; etc.) that are "restricted" for purposes of license exception ENC. Even after such "restricted" encryption products have undergone "one time technical review" by the Bureau of Industry and Security, in order to be qualified for export under license exception ENC, these "restricted" encryption products may not be exported, reexported, or transferred within a single country to any "government end-user" unless it is located in one of the countries listed in supplement no. 3 to part 740 of the EAR.²⁹ An export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security is required to provide any such "restricted" encryption product to any "government end-user" in any non-supplement no. 3 country. Accordingly, if the software supplier's products have been classified by the Bureau of

26. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3).

27. *Id.*

28. Principal differences between the export compliance obligations applicable to mass market encryption software products classified under ECCN 5D992 and other encryption software products classified under ECCN 5D002 that have been qualified for export without export licenses under license exception ENC include: (i) the requirement under section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR to obtain export licenses in order to supply "restricted" ECCN 5D002 software to "government end-users" in certain countries; and (ii) the requirement of section 740.17(e) of the EAR that exports of ECCN 5D002 under license exception ENC must be reported to the Bureau of Industry and Security on a semi-annual basis. § 740.17.

29. The Supplement No. 3 countries include: (i) Canada; (ii) all 27 member states of the European Union; (iii) other European members of NATO (*i.e.*, Norway, Iceland and Turkey); (iv) Switzerland; (v) Australia; (vi) New Zealand; and (vii) Japan. Pt. 740 supp. 3.

Industry and Security as “restricted” encryption products within the meaning of section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR, the supplier must determine if its customer (located in a non-supplement no. 3 country) is a “government end-user” within the meaning of the definition set forth in section 772.1 of the EAR before transmitting or making those software products available to that customer.

- As the software supplier knows the identity (and, presumably, the location) of each individual customer, the supplier must take all appropriate steps to assure that the software is not transmitted to or made available to a customer that: (i) is located in a prohibited destination; (ii) is listed on one of the lists of prohibited and restricted parties; or (iii) will use the software in connection with a WMD proliferation end-use. To that end, the software supplier should take the following compliance steps before concluding the software license agreement with and transmitting the software to the prospective foreign customer:
 - (i) Confirm that the customer is not located in and will not transfer the software to any person or entity located in an embargoed country.
 - (ii) Screen the customer (and any other party to the software licensing transaction) against the various U.S. government lists of prohibited and restricted parties. If there is a suspected “hit” in that screening process, then the software supplier should not proceed with the transaction unless that “hit” is verified as a false positive or unless an export license for the proposed transaction is obtained.³⁰
 - (iii) Obtain an end-use statement from the customer. That end-use statement should ideally include both: (a) an affirmative statement of the customer’s intended end-use of the software product; and (b) the customer’s covenant and undertaking that the software product will not be used, or made available to a third party for use, in activities directly or indirectly related to WMD proliferation.

b. Sale of Software Applications through Online Stores: In the past two years, led by Apple’s enormously successful App Store, there has been tremendous growth and proliferation of online stores selling software applications for use on mobile telephones and other handheld devices.³¹ Under the typical online store model, the entity operating the online store authorizes third parties to develop software applications for distribution through the online store, and the operator then makes those third-party software applications available for purchase by customers through the online store. To that end, the customer registers to use the online store, typically by providing the operator with his/her name, credit or debit card number and e-mail address, and by accepting the operator’s terms of use. The customer is then granted access to a menu that identifies that software applications available through the online store, and may select, purchase, and download the software applications that he/she wishes to acquire. In acquiring a particular software application, the

30. In most instances, if a person or entity appears on one of the lists of prohibited and restricted parties, any application for an export license to supply items subject to the EAR to that person or entity will be summarily rejected. Export licenses may, however, be granted on a case-by-case basis for the export or reexport of non-sensitive items subject to the EAR to certain entities listed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, published as supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR. pt. 744 supp. 3.

31. That online software application business already generates revenues for software application providers in excess of \$1 billion, and the business is expected to grow to at least \$4 billion by 2012. See Douglas MacMillan et al., *Inside the App Economy*, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_44/b4153044881892.htm?chan=magazine%2Fchannel_top%2Fstories.

customer may be required to accept and agree to the terms and conditions of an end-user license agreement (EULA) that states that the software application is licensed to the customer directly by the *software developer*.

Under the definition of an "export," if the online store operator's server is located in the United States, an "export" of a software application occurs whenever that software application is downloaded by a customer to a location outside of the United States.³² Even if the software application was originally developed abroad, once it is loaded onto the online store operator's server in the United States, the software application becomes "subject to the EAR" for U.S. export control purposes.³³ Subsequent download of that software application by a customer located outside of the United States is subject to the full range of U.S. export compliance requirements and restrictions.

As noted above, the party to any export transaction with primary responsibility for assuring compliance with the requirements of the EAR applicable to that transaction is the "exporter." In the online store model, there may be some uncertainty as to which of the several parties to any software application download transaction is the "exporter" of that software application, in the sense that: (i) the developer has developed the software, has furnished the software application to the online store operator for international distribution, and is deemed, as least as a contractual matter, to be licensing the software directly to the customer; (ii) the online store operator is the party that makes the software application available for download, controls the software application acquisition and download transaction, and has visibility as to the identity of the customer, but may not have information about the content or technical features of the software application; and (iii) the customer is the party that actually initiates the download of the software from a server in the United States to a foreign location. Nonetheless, in view of the definition of the term "exporter" in section 772.1 of the EAR, the online store operator should be treated as the "exporter," the party in the United States with authority for controlling the transmission or download of the software application to a location or person outside of the United States.³⁴ As such, the operator of an online software application store will have the following export compliance responsibilities:

- Confirming that each software application is authorized for export in accordance with the requirements of the EAR. To this end, the online store operator will have to rely upon information provided by the various software application developers, as those third party developers will be the only parties with detailed knowledge of the content of their software applications. At a minimum, therefore, the online store operator should require each developer to certify that his/her software applications are duly authorized for export in accordance with the requirements of the EAR. Moreover, as a matter of "best practice," the operator should also require each developer to certify that its software application does not contain or support any data encryption functionality or features. If there is any such encryption function or feature, the developer should be required to furnish to the operator a copy of the CCATS export classification ruling from the Bureau of Industry and Security confirming that that software application meets the criteria for "mass market" encryp-

32. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(1).

33. § 734.3(a)(1).

34. § 772.1.

tion items, and is properly classified for export control purposes under ECCN 5D992.³⁵

- Taking steps to assure that no online store customer is located in an embargoed country.³⁶ To that end, the online store operator should, at a minimum take the following three compliance steps. First, a customer must complete a registration form in order to purchase software applications through the online store. The menu for entering the customer's address should not have entries for, nor should the registration form accept, any address located in an embargoed country (*i.e.*, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria). Second, the online store operator should implement an "IP blocker" so that a person with an Internet address in, or associated with an embargoed country, (*e.g.*, .cu; .ir; .nk; .su; .sy) simply cannot access the online store's website. Third, in agreeing to the online store terms of use, the customer should acknowledge that the online store may not be accessed or used by any person located in an embargoed country, and should certify that he/she is not located in, or is a citizen or resident of any such embargoed country.
- Taking steps to prevent access to the online store by any person or entity included on any of the U.S. government's lists of prohibited and restricted parties. Again, there are at least three compliance steps that the online store operator should take to minimize the risk that software applications will be downloaded by a prohibited or restricted party, as follows. First, at the time that a prospective customer seeks to register to use the online store, the operator should screen that prospective customer against the various lists of prohibited and restricted parties. If there is, in fact, a "hit" against one of those lists, the registration application should be rejected, and the prospective customer should be denied access to the online store. Second, in agreeing to the online store's terms of use, the customer should acknowledge that the online store may not be accessed or used by any person or entity listed on any of the U.S. lists of prohibited and restricted parties, and the customer should certify that he/she is not included on any of those lists. Third, because the various lists of prohibited and restricted parties change frequently, the online store operator should periodically screen its entire customer database against the updated lists of prohibited and restricted parties in order to confirm that no existing customer has been added to one of those lists after he/she registered to use the online store.³⁷
- Taking steps to prevent the use of software applications in WMD proliferation activities. This may be the most difficult of the export compliance responsibilities to fulfill in the online store context because the online store operator may have no way in which to monitor or verify the end-users' actual use of the various software applications. At a minimum, however, the customer should be required to agree to the

35. See § 742.15(b)(1)-(2).

36. Because online store operators typically require customers to register to use the online store, and typically request that customers provide at least a name, e-mail address, and a valid credit or debit card number, those online store operators would not be able to rely upon the provisions of the BIS advisory opinion with respect to downloads by persons located in embargoed countries. See Bureau of Industry and Security, *supra* note 6.

37. The foregoing steps are not, of course, "fool proof," but implementation of those steps should demonstrate good faith on the part of the online store operator to assure compliance with end-user restrictions in the EAR, and are consistent with the access control provisions of the EAR. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii).

online store's terms of use and to each EULA that any software application acquired by the customer through the online store will not be used, or made available to a third party for use, in any activities directly or indirectly related to WMD proliferation activities. The inclusion of such a provision in the terms of use and in each EULA may negate "knowledge" on the part of the online store operator that the software applications are intended for use by the customer in such prohibited end-uses.³⁸

c. *Software as a Service or Cloud Computing:* In recent years, various software developers and suppliers have developed or adopted business models variously described as "software-as-a-service" or "cloud computing." Under these business models, the customer subscribes to a service, which allows the customer to access and use the computational capacity of certain pre-determined software programs resident on the service provider's servers. The customer may access these servers and software programs and manipulate the customer's own data by means of the Internet. The attractiveness of the software as a service or cloud computing business model is that it allows the customer to minimize its investment in information technology infrastructure (computers, software, etc.), as it is able to use the service provider's infrastructure.

A key element of the software as a service business model is that the customer does not purchase, and the service provider does not supply (either physically or electronically), complex software products to run on the customer's computers. The export compliance obligations applicable to this software as a service business model are frequently misunderstood. In a number of instances, U.S. based service providers have erroneously concluded that they are not exporting any software, and therefore they have no compliance responsibilities under the EAR or other U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., the OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations, *infra*). In fact, however, each U.S. based software-as-service provider must be aware of and analyze how its business is affected by the following compliance responsibilities:

- In many instances, it will be necessary for the customer to download certain software code in order to access and utilize the service provider's software. Typically, that software code is furnished to the customer only after the customer has entered into a service agreement with the service provider. As such, the software may not be treated as "publicly available" under section 734.3(b)(3) of the regulations.³⁹ Accordingly, if the software code is to be furnished to a customer located outside of the United States, even only on a transitory basis while the customer is actually accessing and using the software, a software "export" transaction will occur. The service provider must therefore comply with the full range of export compliance responsibilities described in this paper (authorization for export, destination,

38. Under the non-proliferation provisions of sections 744.2, 744.3 and 744.4 of the EAR, an export license is required for the export even of otherwise decontrolled items if, at the time of export, the exporter *knows* (or has reason to know) that the items will be used directly or indirectly in the design, development, production, stockpiling, testing or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles. §§ 744.2(a), 744.3(a), 744.4(a). Those non-proliferation restrictions apply to exports to almost all countries with respect to nuclear weapons end-uses, to those countries listed in Country Group D:3 with respect to chemical and biological weapons end-uses, and to those countries listed in Country Group D:4 with respect to missiles. See pt. 740 supp. 1 (listing the various "Country Groups" for export control purposes).

39. See § 734.3(b)(3).

end-user, and end-use prohibitions and restrictions) in furnishing that software code to the customer.⁴⁰

- By contrast, there may be circumstances where the service provider does not provide any software code or other proprietary technology to the customer, or where all such software and technology is “publicly available” and is not therefore subject to the EAR under section 734.3(b)(3) thereof.⁴¹ In such circumstances, the software as a service transaction itself would not be subject to most of the provisions of the EAR.⁴² That conclusion does *not*, however, imply that the service provider has no compliance responsibilities in providing its software as a service to its customers located outside of the United States. To the contrary, there are at least two sets of compliance concerns that must be addressed by the service provider, as follows:
 - (i) A U.S. person must obtain an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security in order to perform “any contract, service, or employment” which will directly assist in the proliferation of missiles in any Country Group D:4 country or the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons in any country world-wide.⁴³ This applies to the furnishing of any service by a U.S. person to a foreign customer, even when no commodities, software or technology subject to the EAR are involved in the transaction. The service provider does, therefore, have an obligation, in any event, to assure that its customers will not use the service in furtherance of any such WMD proliferation activity.
 - (ii) The OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations typically prohibit (a) the export or reexport of any services from the United States to an embargoed country, or for the benefit of the government of an embargoed country⁴⁴; and (b) any transaction whatsoever in which a person or entity on the OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons has an interest.⁴⁵ In furtherance of its obligations under those OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations, the U.S. based software-as-a-service provider must confirm that its customer is not located in an embargoed country, will not utilize the service for the benefit of the government of an embargoed country, and is not listed on the OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons.⁴⁶
- In the ordinary course of using the service provider’s services, a foreign customer may upload and download data to the service provider’s servers in the United States.

40. Service providers should be aware of the provisions of the regulations governing the furnishing of code required to activate any latent encryption functionality of any software product. See § 742.15(b)(4) (treating software code and components that allow an end-user to activate or enable the cryptographic functionality of other software products as controlled encryption items for export control purposes).

41. See § 734.3(b)(3).

42. See Advisory Opinion, Bureau of Industry & Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Application of EAR to Grid and Cloud Computing Services” (Jan. 13, 2009) available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/advisoryopinions/jan13_2009_ao_on_cloud_grid_computing.pdf (confirming that software “publicly available under § 734.3(b)(3) . . . is not subject to the EAR”).

43. § 744.6(a)(2).

44. See, e.g., Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204-05 (2010).

45. See, e.g., Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 595.201 (2010).

46. The OFAC Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is available on the U.S. Dep’t of Treasury’s website. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS (Apr. 28, 2010), available at <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn>.

To the extent that any such data constitute “technology” within the meaning of section 772.1 of the EAR, the download of those data from the server in the United States to the customer’s computer abroad will constitute an “export” of technology for U.S. export control purposes.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, in its January 13, 2009, advisory opinion, the Bureau of Industry and Security concluded that the U.S. based service provider would not be the “exporter” of those data within the meaning of the definition of that term in section 772.1 of the EAR.⁴⁸ Accordingly, the U.S. based service provider should not be liable for violating the EAR in the event that some of the technology downloaded by the foreign customer is controlled under the EAR, and would require an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security for export to the foreign customer’s location.

- High performance computers are controlled for export under ECCN 4A003, but are eligible for export or reexport to most foreign destinations under authority of license exception APP.⁴⁹ Section 740.7(b)(2)(i) of the EAR, however, provides that no Cuban, Iranian, North Korean, Sudanese, or Syrian national may have *physical or computational access* to any computer that falls within the scope of license exception ENC.⁵⁰ In accordance with section 740.7(b)(2)(i), as a matter of “best practice” and out of an abundance of caution, the U.S. based service provider should include in its service agreement—especially with foreign customers—a specific undertaking and covenant on the part of the customer to the effect that no national of any such embargoed country will utilize the service or will otherwise seek to obtain access to the service provider’s service. That provision should apply even if the servers that will be accessed by any particular foreign customer are located outside of the United States, if those servers were originally exported from the United States or are otherwise subject to the EAR.

V. Conclusion

As explained in this paper, export compliance responsibilities do not disappear simply because a software supplier uses electronic transmission over the Internet as the means of delivering its products to its foreign customers or because the supplier adopts a software-as-a-service business model. To the contrary, each time that a U.S. software supplier transmits or permits the download of any product or software code to or by a foreign customer, an export transaction occurs, to which the full range of export compliance requirements and restrictions mandated by the EAR apply. The furnishing of a service to foreign customers, under the software-as-a-service or cloud computing business model,

47. See 15 C.F.R. § 772.1; pt. 774 supp. 2.

48. See Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 25.

49. § 740.7(a)(1).

50. There is some ambiguity as to the scope of this prohibition on physical or computational access by nationals of embargoed countries. The language of section 740.7(b)(2)(i) of the EAR prohibits access by those embargoed country nationals to any computer that is “eligible for” license exception APP. That language implies that the prohibition applies even if the servers in question are located in the United States. See *id.* § 740.7(b)(2)(i). By contrast, the BIS’s January 13, 2009 advisory opinion on software as a service and cloud computing states that: “If a computer . . . has been exported or reexported . . . under License Exception APP[,] . . . then the access restrictions would still apply, even if the computer . . . will be used to provide a service that is not subject to the EAR.” Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 25.

implies compliance responsibilities on the part of a U.S. service provider, even if no software code or technology is provided to those foreign customers. The impersonal, remote, and quasi-anonymous nature of many Internet transactions may make it unusually difficult for a software supplier or service provider to fulfill these export compliance responsibilities. Nonetheless, any such software supplier or service provider will need to be in a position to demonstrate its compliance efforts—along the lines recommended in this paper—in order to avoid or mitigate severe export enforcement penalties, in the event that its software products or services are diverted to an unauthorized destination, end-user, or end-use.